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Lamontagne: Torts - Injuries Arising from Negligence in Furnishing Liquor to
TORTS-Injuries Arising From Negligence In Furnishing Liquor to Minors and
Intoxicated Adults: New Tort Action In Wyoming. McClellan v. Tottenhoff,
666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
On the evening of July 29, 1980, James Staatz, a 17-year-old minor,
purchased a bottle of peppermint schnapps from the drive-in window at
Tody's Liquors in Cheyenne. 1 Despite Staatz's youthful appearance, no attempt was made by the salesperson to determine his age. 2 Staatz left
Tody's, drank the liquor in his car and became severely intoxicated. He
subsequently drove his car over a viaduct and struck two oncoming vehicles
in their own lane. 8 One of the vehicles was
operated by Chad McClellan who
4
sustained fatal injuries in the accident.
The plaintiffs, the administrator of Chad McClellan's estate and State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company filed suit against Mary Jane
Tottenhoff, owner of Tody's Liquors, and her employee, Michael Buffington, on the ground the defendants had negligently sold liquor to a minor
and that the sale was a proximate cause of the accident which resulted in
Chad McClellan's death. 5 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
arguing that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.6
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss based on the Wyoming Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Parsonsv. JOw7 in which the court
had adopted the traditional common law rationale that consumption, and
not the sale of liquor, is the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury.8
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court expressly overruled Parsons
v. Jow and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. 9 The court
held that 1) a liquor vendor owes a duty to the general public to refrain
from furnishing liquor to a minor and 2) the sale of liquor to a minor' 0 can
be a proximate cause of injury to a third person."
This Note will begin with a brief discussion of the traditional common
law rule of liquor purveyor non-liability and the modern trend of liquor
purveyor liability. A synopsis of the Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis
will follow. The Note will conclude with an examination of the legal principles set forth in McClellan v. Tottenhoff, with particular emphasis on the
extent of potential liability for individuals who negligently furnish liquor in
Wyoming.

BACKGROUND
Traditionally, a person who furnishes liquor to another who consumes
that liquor is not liable either for injuries to the liquor consumer resulting
1. Brief for Appellant at 1, McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. rd. at 1-2.
5. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 409 (Wyo. 1983), reh'g denied, July 19, 1983.
6. Id.
7. 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971).
8. Id.at 397.
9. 666 P.2d at 410.
10. Id. at 412.
11. Id.at 414.
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from the consumer's voluntary intoxication or, in the absence of a
statute,12 to an innocent third party who is injured by the intoxicated liquor
consumer.' s This rule is based upon the theory that the proximate cause of
these injuries is the liquor consumption and not the furnishing of the liquor
to an able bodied person.' 4 The traditional rule also bars civil actions
against individuals who negligently furnish liquor to minors and intoxicated adults in violation of criminal statutes.16
The abrogation of the traditional rule of liquor purveyor non-liability
began in 1959 with the establishment of a common law cause of action for
injuries arising from the negligent sale of liquor.' 6 The seminal cases were
Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store 7 and the landmark case of
Rappaportv. Nichols. "ISince these decisions, the modern trend has been to
allow common law causes of actions against liquor purveyors for injuries to
liquor consumers and innocent third parties caused by the liquor purveyors'
negligence in furnishing alcoholic beverages.' 9
Wyoming was one of a majority of jurisdictions which refused to adopt
the modern rule. Moreover, in the 1971 case of Parsons V. Jow20 the
supreme court expressly adopted the rule of liquor vendor non-liability. In
Parsons, the defendant's employee allegedly sold intoxicating liquor to a
minor driver whose subsequent intoxication resulted in injuries to the
plaintiff-passenger. 2' The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint. Even though the court assumed that 2the
defendant's unlawful sale of liquor to the minor driver was negligence, " it
nonetheless affirmed based on the common law rationale that the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury was the minor's consumption and not
the defendant's sale of the liquor.' 8 The court held that since the legislature
had not seen fit to change this common law rationale, the rule of non4
liability was a bar to plaintiffs cause of action.'
12. In response to the traditional common law rule, which affords practically nothing in the
way of remedies for injury or damage caused by intoxication, the legislatures of many
states have enacted statutes giving a right of action to persons injured by an intoxicated
person against the party who furnished the liquor. These statutes are commonly known
as civil damage or dramshop acts. See 45 AM. JUR. 2d IntoxicatingLiquors 5 561 (1969).
13. 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969).
14. Id.
15. 48A C.J.S. IntoxicatingLiquors § 428 (1981).

16. For an overview of the development of the common law cause of action see Liquor Vendor Liability ForInjuriesCausedBy Intozicated Patrons-A Questionof Policy, 35 OHIO
ST. L. J. 630, 634-41 (1974) and Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494, 496-99

(1981).

17. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
18. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Rappaport

has clearly had the greatest impact on the development of the common law cause of action
for negligence in furnishing liquor to minors and intoxicated adults. According to
Shepard'sAtlantic Reporter Citations,from 1959 to 1983, Rappaporthad been cited in

over 73 published cases in courts other than the New Jersey state courts.
19. See 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 428 (1981).

20. 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971).
21. Id. at 396.
22. Id. at 397.
23. Id.

24. Id. at 398.
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MCCLELLAN V. TOTTENHOFF

In McClellan v. Tottenhoff the court expressly overruled Parsons v.
Jow.25 Justice C. Stuart Brown, speaking for the court, disagreed with the
Parsons court's position that the creation of a cause of action against a liquor purveyor was solely within the province of the legislature. Brown
relied in the court's earlier decision in Choman v. Epperly26 and on section
8-1-101 of the Wyoming Statutes 27 to support the majority's position that
because the rule of non-liability
was created by the judiciary it could be
28
abrogated by the judiciary.
Duty
After demonstrating its legal authority to modify the traditional common law rule, the court held that a liquor vendor owes a duty to exercise
the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances.25 The court stated that the question of whether a duty exists is
one of law and discussed several cases where the courts of other jurisdictions have recognized a common law cause of action against liquor
vendors.8 0 The court then adopted the view that a liquor vendor owes the
same duty to the whole world as does any other persons' and agreed with
other courts that there is no justification
for excusing the licensed liquor
82
vendor from that general duty.
After determining that a common law duty exists, the court recognized
that duty may be based upon criminal statutes. The court determined that
sections 12-5-301(aXv) and 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes were intended to protect the general public as well as minors. 3 Section
12-5-301(aXv) of the Wyoming statutes provides:
(a) Upon approval of the licensing authority, a drive-in area adjacent or contiguous to the licensed room may be used by the holder
of a retail liquor license for taking orders, making delivery of and
receiving payment for alcoholic beverages under the following
conditions:
(v) no order shall be received from 4nor delivery made to a
minor or intoxicated person in the area.
25. 666 P.2d 408, 410 (Wyo. 1983).
26. 592 P.2d 714 (Wyo. 1979). In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rooney, who authored
the opinion in Choman v. Epperly, disagreed with the majority's reliance on the case as
authority for declaring new common law. 666 P.2d at 418 (Rooney, C.J., dissenting).
However, the court also relied upon Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521
P.2d 1339 (Wyo. 1974) as authority for declaring new common law.
27. Wyo. STAT. § 8-1-101 (1977) states in relevant parts:

The common law of England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the

same is of a general nature and not inapplicable... are the rule of decision in

this state when not inconsistent thereof, and are considered as of full force until
repealed by legislative authority.

28. 666 P.2d at 411. For a favorable review of McCleUan, see 26 ATLA L. REP. 297, 297-99
(Sept. 1983).

29. 666 P.2d at 412.
30. Id. at 411-12.
31. Id. at 412.
32. Id. at 411.
33. Id. at 413.
34. WYo. STAT. § 12-5-301(a) (v) (1977).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984
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Section 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes provides:
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be
sold, furnished or given away any alcohol, liqour or malt beverage
to any person under the age of nineteen (19), who is not his legal
ward, medical patient, or member of his own immediate family, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.3 5
The Wyoming Supreme Court then held that the violation of either section
12-5-301(aXv) or section 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes "is evidence
with other
of negligence and may be considered by the trier of fact together
36
circumstances in determining the issue of negligence."
ProximateCause
The court's next step in establishing a common law cause of action
against liquor vendors was to address the issue of proximate cause. The
court held that the sale of liquor can be the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injuries. It specifically held that the test concerning proximate
cause is whether "the vendor could foresee injury to a third person...
whether or not the specific injury was foreseen.3 7 The court cited several
Wyoming cases to support the legal principles that: 1) proximate cause
means the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence
of the act of negligence; 2) the same principles of proximate cause apply
whether the negligence is a violation of a statutory duty or a common law
duty; and 3) the question of whether proximate cause exists is one for the
unless the evidence shows that reasonable persons could not
trier of fact,
38
disagree.
The defendants had argued, however, that even if the sale of liquor can
be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, the act of becoming intoxicated is an independent intervening cause.3 9 The court rejected the argument and held that a subsequent event does not relieve an earlier actor of
liability if it was reasonably foreseen. 40 The court then considered the facts
35. Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101(a) (1977).
36. 666 P.2d at 414. The court based its determination that the violation of these statutes was
evidence of negligence and not negligence per se upon its earlier holding in Distad v.
Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981). There the court held that the violation of a statute is not
always negligence per se and the determination of which standard to adopt, in the
absence of express statutory language, is within the sole discretion of the court. Id.
37. 666 P.2d at 414.
38. Id.

39. Brief for Appellee at 3-4, McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983). An intervening cause is one which comes into active operation after a defendant's negligent act
or omission has occurred; and, ordinarily the defendant will be relieved of liability by an
unforeseeable intervening cause. Id.
40. 666 P.2d at 413. The court agreed with the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) regarding proximate cause. The
court cited with approval the following progressive language of Rappaporton the issue of
proximate cause:
[A] tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in
the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient
if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries.
[Citations.] The fact that there were also intervening causes which were
foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the
tortfeasor of liability. [Citations.] Ordinarily these questions of proximate and
intervening cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. 156 A.2d at

9.
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alleged in the complaint and stated that it was in no position to hold as a
matter of law that the minor's intoxication could not have been foreseen or
that there could not have been a direct proximate causal connection between defendants' unlawful conduct and the decedent's injuries. 41 By citing
1977 Wyoming State Highway Department Statistics which showed that
nearly one-fourth of the drivers involved in fatal accidents where alcohol
was a contributing factor were under 21 years old, 42 the court supported its
conclusion that the defendants' unlawful conduct exposed the traveling
public to a foreseeable risk of harm.4 s
Social Policy
In support of the majority's decision to abrogate the common law rule
of non-liability, Justice Brown identified two ways in which society is harmed by refusing to acknowledge a claim for relief against a liquor vendor.
First, he stated that the rule of non-liability is an unjust doctrine which
often limits a plaintiffs recovery because minors do not have the financial
resources of an established business. 44 Second, because liquor licenses are
seldom revoked there is no effective deterrent to keep liquor vendors from
selling liquor to minors or intoxicated persons. 45 Justice Brown then concluded the majority's opinion by stating: "We note that several courts have
bemoaned the fact that an injured third person had no cause of action, even
though they have continued to defer to the legislature. We do not choose to
stand by and wring our hands at the unfairness which we ourselves have
created."46
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court's holding in McClellan v. Tottenhoff is
significant in several respects. First, it brings Wyoming in step with the
modern trend of liquor purveyor liability and consequently affords injured
individuals a common law right to seek relief.' 7 Second, Wyoming is the
27th jurisdiction to judicially modify or completely abrogate the traditional
common law rule of liquor purveyor non-liability. 48 Although several
41. 666 P.2d at 414.
42. Id. at 415.
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See ATLA. L. REP. 297, 297-99 (Sept. 1983).
48. Twenty-seven jurisdictions have judicially modified or abrogated the rule of non-liability
(Arizona abrogated the rule after the Wyoming Supreme Court delivered McClellan):
Ariz.
Alaska (Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (1981)); Ariz., (Ontiveros v. Borak, __
667 P.2d 200 (1983)); Colo., (Kerby v. The Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127,
532 P.2d 975 (1974)); Del., (Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765 (Super. Ct. 1978) and Wright v.
Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (1981)); D.C. (Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)); Fla., (Davis v. Schiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (1963)); Hawaii (Ono v. Applegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980)); Idaho (Algeria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,
619 P.2d 135 (1980)); Ind., (Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966)); Iowa
(Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (1977)); Ky., (Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (1968));
La., (Chausse v. Southland Corp., 400 So.2d 1199 (App., 1st Cir., 1981)); Mass., (Adamian
v. Three Sons Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968)); Mich., (Thaut v. Finley, 50
Mich.App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973)); Minn., (Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213
N.W.2d 618 (1973)); Miss., (Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213 (1979)); Mo.,
(Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. App. 1983)); N.H., (Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H.
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jurisdictions continue to adhere to the traditional rule, 49 to the extent that
the rule has been modified the modern rule of liquor purveyor liability is
now the majority rule in the United States. Third, the progressive nature
of the court's opinion places Wyoming among the leading jurisdictions in
the development of the rule of liquor purveyor liability.
Duty Imposed By Statute
The supreme court determined that sections 12-5-301(aXv) and
12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes were enacted to protect the general
public as well as minors.50 This finding is significant because in order for a
plaintiff to maintain a cause of action based on the defendant's violation of
a statute, the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons intended to
be protected by the statute. 51 In Distadv. Cubin,52 the court adopted the
four point test of section 286 of the Second Restatement of Torts to determine whether a statute could be used to define the standard of conduct of a
reasonable person." Although not expressly enumerated in McClellan, the
four point test is implied in the court's holding that sections 12-5-301(aXv)
and 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes establish a duty toward the
general public. The four point test provides that a legislative enactment
may be adopted by the court as the standard of conduct of a reasonable person if its purpose is found to be exclusively or in part 1) to protect the class
of persons of which the plaintiff is a member, 2) to protect the plaintiff's interest which was invaded, 3) to protect the plaintiffs interest against the
kind of harm which has resulted and 4) to protect the plaintiff's interest
against the particular hazard from which the harm resulted.r 4
A plaintiff who bases a claim for relief upon defendant's violation of
one of the statutes construed by the supreme court should be prepared to

49.

50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

(Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. App. 1983)); N.H., (Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H.
375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965)); N.J., (Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959));
N.M., (Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982)); N.Y., (Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381,
262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965)); N.C., (Hutchens v. Hankins,__ N.C. App. -,
303 S.E.2d
584 (1983)); Ore., (Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237,566 P.2d 893 (1977)); Pa., (Jardine
v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964)); S.D., (Walz v.
City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (1982)); Tenn., (Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656,
393 S.W.2d 755 (1964) and Brookins v. The Round Table Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547 (1981));
Wash., (Halvorsen v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969) and
Callan v. O'Neill, 20 Wn. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978)).
The 10 jurisdictions which expressly adhere to the rule of non-liablity are: Ala., (Maples
v. Chinese Palace, Inc., 389 So.2d 120 (1980)); Ark., (Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385
S.W.2d 656 (1965)); Conn., (Nelson v. Steffens, 170 Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976));
Ga., (Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga. App. 23, 237 S.E.2d 443 (1977)); M., (Ruth v.
Benvenutti, 114 Ill.
App. 3d 546, 449 N.E.2d 209 (1l.App. 3 Dist. 1983)); Md., (Felder v.
Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981)); Mont., (Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589
P.2d 145 (1979)); Neb., (Holmes V. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976)); Nev.,
(Yoseovitch v. Wasson, -. Nev. , 645 P.2d 975 (1982)); Wis., (Olsen v. Copeland, 90
Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979)).
666 P.2d at 413.
PROSSER, TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971). Other jurisdictions which have construed similar
statutes to impose a civil duty for the protection of the general public are: Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Washington. (See supra note 47 for the respective cases.)
633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981).
Id. at 175.
Id.
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satisfy the four point test adopted in Distad.To the extent that the facts of
a given case vary from those in McClellan, it will be more important for a
plaintiff to satisfy the test, so that the trial court will allow the standard imposed by statute to define the element of duty. Satisfying the four point
test will be important, for instance, in cases where the plaintiff is the minor
to whom liquor was furnished (or the administrator of the minor's estate) 65
or when the plaintiff is injured by some other hazard than an intoxicated
minor's operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway.
The Evidence of Negligence Standard
The court's determination that the violation of statute is evidence of
negligence appears to be an attempt to moderate the impact of its otherwise sweeping opinion. 56 The effect of adopting the evidence of negligence
standard is that it is left to the trier of fact 57
to determine whether the defendant's violation of a statute is negligence.
A related issue not addressed by the court is whether one must know or
should know that an individual to whom liquor is furnished is a minor in
order to violate the statutes, or whether one who furnishes liquor to a
minor violates the statutes as a matter of law. Section 12-6-101(e) of the
Wyoming Statutes" provides a liquor licensee with an affirmative defense
to any criminal prosecution or action for the suspension or revocation of his
license when accused of selling liquor to a minor. The affirmative defense
permits the liquor licensee to prove that he demanded, was shown, and
acted in reasonable reliance upon, one of the prescribed documents of identification to determine the age and identity of the minor.
The Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted the reasonable reliance requirement of section 12-6-101(e)59 of the Wyoming Statutes in the case of
Rancher Bar and Lounge v. State.60 In Rancher the court accepted the
thesis that a liquor licensee is not strictly liable for selling liquor to a minor
and is only required to exercise the degree of caution which would be shown
55. The following cases deal with the right of minors to whom liquor was furnished to recover
as a protected class: Brannigan v. Raybuck, __ Ariz. -, 667 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1983);
Morris v. Farley Enterprises, Inc., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983); Davis v. Schiappacossee,
155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Brookins v. The
Round Table, 624 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn. 1981).
56. All jurisdictions which have established a duty based on statute (see supra note 50) have
held that the violation of the statute is negligence per se except: Mass., (Adamian v.
Three Sons Inc., 353 Mass. 493, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968)); N.H., (Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H.
375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965)); N.J., (Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959)).
These jurisdictions have held that violation of the statute is evidence of negligence.
57. PROSSER, TORTS

§

36 (4th ed. 1971).

58. Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101(e) (1977) provides:
A motor vehicle driver's license, a registration certificate issued under the
Federal Selective Service Act, an identification card issued to a member of the

armed forces or an identification card issued by the department of revenue is
prima facie evidence of the age and identity of a person. Proof that a licensee or
his employee or agent demanded, was shown and acted in reasonable reliance
upon the information contained in any one (1)of the above documents as identification is a defense to any criminal prosecution for the suspension or revocation of a license.

59. Id. The court actually interpreted Wyo.
STAT. § 12-6-101(e) (1977).
60. 514 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1973).

STAT.

§ 12-33(b) (1957) which is identical to Wyo.
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by a reasonable and prudent person in the same or similar circumstances.61
This reasoning would presumably apply in a civil action so that the jury
would have to find that the defendant failed to exercise the degree of care
of a reasonable and prudent person to find that the defendant violated one
by selling liquor to a person he should have known was a
of the 6statutes
2
minor.

Under the evidence of negligence standard, the defendant's violation of
a statute is usually only one factor considered by the jury in determining
the issue of negligence. However, the court's reasoning in Rancher implies
that the reasonable person standard is central to a finding that a defendant
violated either section 12-5-301(aXv) or section 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming
Statutes. Therefore, a determination that the defendant violated one of the
statutes is implicitly a determination that the defendant failed to act as a
reasonable person and should, in reality, be conclusive on the issue of
negligence.
Finally, even if the evidence of negligence standard imposes a greater
burden on the plaintiff than the negligence per se standard, the ability of a
plaintiff to rely upon a standard which is clearly defined in a statute is
significant. A successful showing by the plaintiff that the defendant breached the standard of care clearly established by statute is bound to have a
more profound impact on the jury than an effort by the plaintiff to show
that the defendant breached the nebulous common law standard of care of
a reasonable person.
Common Law Duty
The most striking part of the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in
McClellan v. Tottenhoff is its holding that a liquor vendor owes a duty, independent of statute, to exercise the degree of 68care required of a
reasonable person in light of all the circumstances. Precisely how far
reaching the court's holding will be with respect to the common law duty is
the common
not clear. 64 What is clear is that the court intended to impose
law duty upon liquor vendors and not upon social hosts. 65 In its discussion
and analysis of the common law duty, the court was careful to refer exclusively 86to liquor vendors (which presumably includes all licensed liquor
vendors).
61. Id. at 635. Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101(e) (1977) presumably applies to provide an affirmative
defense for violation of both Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101(a) (1977) and WYo. STAT. §
12-5-301(a) (v) (1977).
62. In a civil action the defendant would presumably also be permitted to argue that he was
reasonable in relying upon the minor s physical appearance to determine that the minor
was of age. If such a defense is raised, the jury should be allowed to determine whether
the defendant exercised the degree of care of a reasonable person in relying upon the
minor's physical appearance.
63. 666 P.2d at 412. Only the following ten jurisdictions have established a common law duty
independent of a duty imposed by statute requiring individuals to refrain from furnishing
liquor to minors and/or intoxicated adults: Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Min-

nesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon and Pennsylvania. (See supra note 47 for the
respective cases).
64. The development of the case law in New Jersey is indicative of the potential impact of the
refrain
from
furnishing
liquor.
common
lawoverview
duty imposed
on individualsoftoNew
185
v. Knoll,
law see Figuly
casenegligently
Jersey
of the development
For abrief
(1982).
564-65
564,
N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d
65. 666 P.2d at 409-12. However social host liability would be consistent with the court's construction of the Wyoming Statutes. See infra test accompanying note 86.
66. Wyo. STAT. § 12-1-101(a) (viii) (1977) defines a licensed liquor vendor as follows:
"Licensee" means a person holding a:
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Ultimately, the importance of imposing a duty upon liquor vendors to
exercise reasonable care independent of statutes is that it will enable the
district courts of Wyoming to adjudicate tort claims which do not arise
from the violation of statute. This is appropriate because to limit the flexibility of the trial courts to adjudicate individual cases upon their own
merits would unduly retard the development of the law in Wyoming
regarding the negligent sale of liquor.
Proximate Cause
The critical element of the plaintiff's case will be persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant's negligence in furnishing liquor was a proximate
cause of plaintiff s injuries. The plaintiff will be required to show that his injury was a natural and probable consequence of defendant's negligence
which was or should have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant and
that but67for the defendant's negligence the plaintiff would not have been
injured.
The difficulty in proving that it is more likely than not that defendant's
conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury will depend upon the
particular facts of each case. If the court's discussion in McClellan is indicative of the future treatment of tort actions for negligence in furnishing
liquor, the strongest cases will be those involving injuries to members of
the traveling public arising from the sale of liquor to minors. 68 Although the
court's holding on the issue of proximate cause is broad enough to allow
recovery in other factual situations, 69 to the extent the facts diverge from
those in McClellan, the plaintiffs burden of proof,7 0 especially on the element of proximate cause, will become heavier.

67.
68.
69.
70.

(A) Retail liquor license;
(B) Limited retail liquor license;
(C) Resort liquor license;
(D) County retail malt beverage permit;
(E) Malt beverage permit;
(F) Restaurant liquor license; or
(G) Catering permit.
The court's holding in McClellan should expose all "licensees" to liability for negligently
selling liquor. Individuals who hold either a malt beverage permit or a catering permit
may notbe aware of this potential liability and should be so informed by the licensing
authority. Unlicensed liquor vendors would presumably also be subject to liability for
violating the common law duty. See Wyo. STAT. § 12-1-101(a) (xvi) (1977) for the definition of "sell" or "sale".
PROSSER, TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971). See also supra note 40.
666 P.2d at 415.
See supra text accompanying note 38.
The traditional four elements of a negligence cause of action can be particularized so that
ma=ing out a prima facie case for negligence in furnishing alcohol would require a showing that: 1) the defendant furnished 2) alcoholic beverages 3) to an individual the defendant knew or should have known was a minor 4) in violation of a statute or under such circumstances that the reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would have
refrained from furnishing alcoholic beverages to the individual, 5) and the defendant
could reasonably foresee that the individual would use or operate a dangerous instrumentality (i.e., a motor vehicle), 6) and the individual's mental or physical abilities became impaired as a result of the consumption of the alcoholic beverages furnished by the defendant 7) so that such impairment was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. (The
above elements would also be essential to make out a prima facie case for negligence in
furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person.) For a similar delineation of the elements needed to make out a prima facie case, see Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 431
N.E.2d 920, 926 n.9 (1982).
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Liability ForSelling Liquor to Intoxicated Persons
The court stated that it saw no difference between statutes which forbid the furnishing of liquor to intoxicated persons and those which forbid
the furnishing of liquor to minors.7 1 "The idea behind both statutes is that
these people [minors and intoxicated adults] are more likely to be unable to
from themselves, and that society
handle alcohol, that they need '7protection
2
needs protection from them."
Section 12-5-301(aXv) of the Wyoming Statutes not only prohibits a liquor vendor from selling liquor to a minor in a drive-in area but also prohibits its sale to an intoxicated person. There can be little doubt from the
majority's reasoning and its construction of section 12-5-301(aXv) that the
general public is also intended to be protected from injuries resulting from
the sale of liquor to intoxicated persons in a drive-in area. The decision in
McClellan should therefore extend liquor liability to include the sale of liquor to minors and intoxicated persons when that sale is in violation of secarticulated
tion 12-5-301(aXv). This result is consistent with the principles
73
in McClellan, particularly on the issue of proximate cause.
Less clear, however, is whether the liquor vendor owes a common law
duty to refrain from selling liquor to intoxicated persons. Close scrutiny of
the court's holding leads to the conclusion that the liquor vendor does owe
the general public such a duty. Although the court imposes the common law
from
duty upon liquor vendors, and not social hosts, the court refrained
74
restricting its holding solely to the sale of liquor to minors.
It is difficult to see how the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person
would expose the public to less of a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm
than the sale of liquor to a minor who may not be intoxicated. Both classes
of individuals are particularly vulnerable to the disabling effects of alcohol
and both classes of individuals pose a serious and foreseeable threat of
danger to the safety of others. To distinguish liquor vendor liability on the
basis of whether the sale of liquor is to a minor or an intoxicated person
would be inconsistent with the negligence principles articulated in Mcdiminish the deterrent effect of imposing civil liability
Cleltan,15 and would 76
upon liquor vendors.
A question still remains concerning the standard by which the trier of
fact would decide whether a liquor vendor breached the duty imposed by
statute or by common law in selling liquor to an intoxicated person. Does
the person have to be obviously intoxicated or does the person have to be
only legally presumed intoxicated 7 7 in order for the liquor vendor to be
71. 666 P.2dat 413.
72. Id.
73. See supra text accompanying note 38. It is certainly reasonably foreseeable that a minor
or intoxicated person ordering and receiving liquor in a drive-in area will be operating a
motor vehicle.
74. 666 P.2d at 413.
75. The court stated "[h]enceforth, cases involving vendors of liquor and injured third parties
will be approached in the same manner as other negligence cases." Id. at 411.
76. See upra text accompanying note 45.
77. Wyo. STAT. § 31-5-233(b) (iii) (1977) provides that if:
ten one-hundredths of one percent (0.10%) or more by weight of alcohol [is) in
the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor....

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss1/16

10

Lamontagne: Torts - Injuries Arising from Negligence in Furnishing Liquor to
1984

CASE NOTES

negligent? In Combined Insurance Company of America v. Sinclair, 8 the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption of intoxication was not applicable to a civil action for damages.7 9 Given the absence of
any statutory provisions regarding the determination of intoxication for
purposes of section 12-5-301(aXv) and given the court's holdings in both
Sinclair and Rancher, it is reasonable to conclude that the trier of fact
would have to find that an individual was obviously intoxicated in order to
determine that a liquor vendor was negligent in selling liquor to that
individual.
The additional issue of whether a liquor vendor owes a duty to minors
or intoxicated adults to refrain from selling them liquor for their own safety raises some difficult questions. Jurisdictions which have considered
whether liquor vendors can be liable to liquor consumers for injuries caused
by their own intoxication have reached opposite results.80 Some cases appear to distinguish liability on whether the consumer was on the liquor vendor's premises at the time of the consumer's injury or death. 8' Of course, of
great significance is the extent of the consumer's own negligence,82 or
whether the consumer is a member of a class intended to be protected by
criminal statutes.88
In light of the court's holding in McClellan, the trier of fact should be
allowed to consider whether a defendant exercised the degree of care required of a reasonable person under the circumstances. The liquor consumer's ability to recover will no doubt depend on the comparative
negligence of the parties. Although the factual determinations may be difficult to make, a court should not prevent the issues of negligence and proximate cause from going to the jury by holding as a matter of law that a liquor vendor could not be liable to a minor or intoxicated liquor consumer.
Social Host Liability
If the sections of the Wyoming Statutes construed by the court
establish a duty toward the general public, then it would appear that social
hosts owe the general public the same duty of care not to serve alcoholic
beverages to minors. Section 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes states
that "[elvery person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic liquor [to a minor] . . . is guilty of a
misdemeanor." 8 The legislature has expressly prohibited every person
(with the exception of the minor's legal guardian, doctor, or immediate
family)88 from giving as well as selling alcoholic beverages to a minor. Since
78. 584. P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1978).
79. Id. at 1047. See also 48 C.J.S. IntoxicatingLiquors § 258 (1981).
80. For an overview of the law on this question see Annot., 98 A.L.R. 3d 123 (1980).
81. Id. See also Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 628 (1960).
82. Id.
83. For a discussion of analogous torts where the plaintiff is a member of a protected class,
see Note, Common Law Liability of The Liquor Vendor, 18 WESTERN Rus. L. REv. 251,
270-74 (1966).
84. See supra text accompanying note 29.
85. Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101(a) (1977).
86. Id. Chief Justice Rooney argues in his dissenting opinion that the immunity granted to
certain individuals is evidence that the statute was not intended to protect the general
public. "The general public is not protected at all if the minor can legally receive the
alcoholic liquor or malt beverage from his guardian or from a member of his immediate
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the statute construed by the court makes no distinction between commercial and non-commercial liquor purveyors, the statute apparently imposes
the same duty upon social hosts as liquor vendors to refrain from furnishing
alcoholic liquor to minors for the protection of both minors and the general
public. Breach of this duty should expose both liquor vendors and social
hosts to civil liability.
Although there is considerable opposition to imposing civil liability
upon social hosts,87 social host liability was the result in the Indiana case of
Brittainv. Herron" where the court construed an Indiana statute similar
to section 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes. 9 In Brittain,the defendant permitted her minor brother and his minor friend to consume alcoholic
beverages she had in her home.90 The defendant apparently knew or should
have known that her brother was a minor and had driven to her home since
he resided with their parents in a neighboring town. 91 After consuming
several drinks, the defendant's brother became
intoxicated and drove his
92
car into a pick-up truck, killing four persons.
The court held that under Indiana law the non-commercial supplier of
liquor could be liable for negligence in violating the statute prohibiting the
furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a minor.9 3 The court cited the earlier
Indiana decision of Elder v. Fisher94 to support the proposition that the
statute had been enacted to protect the general public. 9 Since the
legislature had not seen fit to distinguish between a social provider and a

87.

88.

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

family.... Because certain classes of persons do not have a duty to refrain from furnishing such alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to minors, it cannot be said that the duty
imposed on those not in such classes is one owed to the public." 666 P.2d at 416 (Rooney,
C.J., dissenting).
Annot., 97 A.L.R. 3d 528, 574 (1980) presents cases where the liability of one gratuitously furnishing intoxicating liquors in violation of statute was held not supportable under
the particular circumstances involved. See also DEMouLI & WHrrCOMB. Social Host's
Liability in FurnishingAlcoholic Beverages, 27 FED'N INS. COUNS. QUARTERLY, 349
(1977) and Note, Liability of Social Host ForFurnishingLiquor, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 975
(1979).
159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1979). For a similar result see Coulter v. Superior
Court of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Linn
v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Company, 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972); and Annot., 53 A.L.R. 3d 1285
(1973). (The California cases were subsequently reversed by the legislature and the rule
of non-liability for liquor purveyors was re-instituted in California. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.
3d 528, 573 n.48 (1977)). See also GRAHAM, Liabilityof the Social Hostfor Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETTE L. J. 561 (1980).
The statute construed by the Indiana court was IND. CODE ANN. § 12-610 (Burns 1956)
which read in part:
12-610. Minors-Habitual drunkards- Houses of ill fame-Sales prohibited. No
alcoholic beverages shall be sold, bartered, exchanged, given, provided or furnished to any person under the age of twenty-one [21] years.... Any person
guilty of violating this paragraph shall be punished...
The Indiana statute has been redesignated IND. CODE ANN.§ 7.1-5-7-8 (Bums 1978 &
Supp. 1983). The Indiana legislature has evidently not seen fit to alter the liability of
social hosts imposed by Brittain v. Herron because the statute has not been amended
with the exception that the legislature has enacted a subsection exempting educational institutions from civil liability. See IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-7-8(b) (Burns 1978 & Supp.
1983).
159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150, 152 (1974).
Id.

Id.
Id.
247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966).
309 N.E.2d at 156.
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liquor vendor in the criminal statute, the court reasoned9that
to distinguish
6
civil liability on that basis was inequitable and illogical.
To distinguish liability on that basis in Wyoming would be inconsistent
with the statutory construction set forth by the Wyoming Supreme Court
in McClellan. If section 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes is intended to
protect the general public, then the violation of the statute by any person
who is prohibited from furnishing liquor to a minor should expose that person to liability.
One can argue that social hosts do not derive economic benefit from
furnishing liquor and therefore they should not be exposed to liability.
However, the countervailing social policy weighs heavily against
precluding social hosts from liability strictly upon an economic basis. First,
one does not need to be in the business of selling liquor to reasonably
foresee the risk of harm to which a minor and the general public are exposed when liquor is furnished to that minor. Second, an adult social host will
most likely be in a better financial position than a minor to bear the plaintiff's loss. Third, the exposure of social hosts to potential liability will serve
to deter the cavalier attitude that some adults have regarding the consequences of serving liquor to minors. Given the immunity granted to certain
classes of people under section 12-6-101(a) of the Wyoming Statutes, and
the limited application of the statute to the furnishing of liquor to minors
(not intoxicated persons), the statute should remain unamended and should
be construed to impose liability upon social hosts as well as liquor vendors
who negligently furnish liquor to minors.
97

Affirmative Defenses
In most cases involving a defendant's negligence in furnishing intoxicating liquor, there will be two classes of plaintiffs: innocent members of
the general public and liquor consumers (minors and adults) or their
associates. The ability of the defendant to successfully raise affirmative
defenses will depend upon to which of the two categories the plaintiff
belongs. Absent some peculiar facts, it will be difficult if not impossible for
a defendant to successfully argue that an innocent member of the general
public was contributorily negligent. The best the defendant can do is to successfully rebut one or more of the elements of the plaintiff's prima facie
case. 98 However, affirmative defenses are much more important when the
plaintiff is a liquor consumer or his compatriot.9
Although the defense of assumption of risk is limited to a form of contributory negligence in Wyoming,1 00 the supreme court held in Sherman v.
Platte County °1 that the "obvious danger" rule was not abrogated by the
comparative negligence statute and that there is no duty on the part of the
defendant to remove or warn of a danger if it is an obvious danger or one
96. Id.
97. For an overview of some affirmative defenses, see Comment, Negligence Actions Against
LiquorPurveyors:FillingThe Gap In South Dakota,23 S. D. L. REv. 227, 251-58 (1978).
98. See supra note 70.
99. Comment, supra note 97, at 258.
100. See Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979).
101. 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982).
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that is known to the plaintiff. 10 2 The "obvious danger" rule, as applied by
the court in Sherman, is analgous to primary assumption of risk'0 3 and is
inconsistent with the purpose of the comparative negligence act because it
is an absolute defense. 10 4
It is not entirely clear to which cases the "obvious danger" rule can be
applied in Wyoming. 106 The rule has apparently been applied in cases involving collateral issues of master and servant law, plaintiffs status as
trespasser, licensee, or invitee and governmental liability. 06 Whether the
"obvious danger" rule can be applied as a defense in certain cases involving
negligence in furnishing liquor is questionable, but as long as the rule is law
in Wyoming, the possibility exists that the defense could be used to relieve
a defendant of liability.
Affirmative defenses can be used by a defendant liquor purveyor to defend against an action by the liquor consumer or his associate in a number
of situations. Depending upon the facts of a particular case, the defendant
can show that the consumer was contributorily negligent in becoming intoxicated, or in knowingly operating a motor vehicle or in engaging in
other activities with the defendant's guests or patrons while under the influence of alcohol. The "obvious danger" rule might also be involved when
a consumer injures himself on the defendant's premises. Likewise a friend
or associate of the liquor consumer can be found to be contributorily
negligent by accepting a ride with the intoxicated consumer, encouraging
the consumer's excessive drinking or otherwise engaging in activities with
the intoxicated consumer when he knows or should know of the risks

involved. 107

CONCLUSION

The development of Wyoming law based on the supreme court's decision in McClellan v. Tottenhoff is difficult to predict. What is easy to
predict, however, is the political pressure the liquor lobby will bring to bear
upon the Wyoming Legislature in an effort to minimize the potential impact of McClellan. What McClellan really represents is the recognition of
the right of injured parties to seek compensation for their losses arising
from a defendant's negligence in furnishing liquor to those who are unable
to handle its effects, and the development of the law in this area is best left
to the jury and the judiciary. To attempt to anticipate and limit the effect of
McClellanby legislative enactment will only lead to unjust disparities in the
application of the civil law.
102. Id. at 790.
103. For a discussion of the classes of assumption of risk, see PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (4th ed.
1971).
104. See Note, Torts-Assumption of Risk and the Obvious DangerRule. Primary or Secondary Assumption of Risk? 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 373, 376 (1983).
105. Id. at 377.
106. Id.
107. See generally 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 439-41 (1981) for a discussion of the
judicial treatment given affirmative defenses.
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The long range impact of McClellan will be its deterrent effect to keep
liquor purveyors from furnishing liquor to minors and intoxicated adults.
As Justice Brown correctly hypothesized, "perhaps the threat of civil
liability or increased insurance premiums 0 8 will serve to make liquor vendors more careful."' 1 9 There can be little doubt that liquor purveyors will
exercise greater care to avoid the civil liability which was previously nonexistent at common law.
OVIDE M. LAMONTAGNE

108. An indication of the impact of the court's decision in Wyoming was evident in a notice by
the Cheyenne Independent Insurance Agents which appeared in the Wyoming TribuneEagle, July 17, 1983, at 28, cols. 3-5 as follows:
NOTICE-To all individuals/businesses engaged in the manufacturing,
distributing, selling or serving of alcoholic beverages... May we recommend
you contact your INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENT to determine
whether you should purchase LIQUOR LEGAL LIABILITY COVERAGE, in
view of the recent Wyoming Supreme Court Decision which overturned the
1971 precedent decision.
109. 666 P.2d at 415. See also Bars Have a Responsibility, Victims of Drunks Say, The
Denver Post, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4-A. col. 1.
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